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Extended decision-making through the use of proxy decision-makers has been 
enshrined in a range of International Codes, Professional Guidance and Statute,1 and 
is now widely seen as a useful means through which we can exercise control over 
decisions that affect our lives when we have lost capacity to make these decisions 
for ourselves.2 Although there may be an expectation by currently competent 
individuals wishing to make use of this provision that appointing a proxy will allow 
control to be retained over important decisions, numerous concerns have been 
raised as to how we might best establish the way in which a proxy makes their 
decisions that can shape, curtail or restrict the decisions a proxy can make. These 
concerns have tended to focus on content, that is, the kind of decision the proxy can 
make and the way in which a decision is arrived at, such as through substituted 
judgements or best interest approaches. However, there is little theoretical work 
that has tried to explain how or why proxy decision-making is anything other than a 
useful practical or legal convention when it comes to autonomous adults wishing to 
appoint their own proxy to cover future incapacity. Therefore, there remains an 
                                                 
1 For example, the UK Mental Capacity Act (2005) section 9.1; The General Medical Council (2010); 
the US National Guardianship Association (2007); Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009); CIOMS-
WHO (2002) section 6. Court cases such as Re Quinlan (1976) in the US have also contributed to 
establishing the groundings for the legal status of the proxy, albeit in terms of who might be suitable as 
a proxy in cases where there was no clear appointment of them by a still competent individual.  
2 I will here limit myself to discussion of proxy consent for adults appointed prior to the loss of 
competence by the person they are acting as proxy for. The issue of proxy consent for adults who have 
never been competent, for adults who did not appoint then proxy before losing competence, and for 
children, all involve a different set of ethical considerations that do not directly stem from arguments 
surrounding extending our autonomy and transferring our authority.  
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ethical question as to how we might provide a substantial theoretical basis to explain 
why it is that we should respect the decisions made by a proxy and that would also 
serve to underpin the legal or pragmatic institutions of proxy decision-making.  
 
Asking such a question about ethical underpinnings is to move the focus of debate 
surrounding proxies away from the content and nature of their decision-making 
judgements to one of authority and scope: a question surrounding who is making the 
decision. Moreover, this is not ‘authority’ in terms of whether or not we have made 
legal provision for a proxy decision-maker or whether we need, as a matter of 
pragmatics, to designate someone to take up the burden of decision-making for 
someone who has become incapacitated. Rather, it is a question of moral authority. I 
take moral authority to correspond to a normative relation between persons, such 
that the decision of a person is sufficient to give us a moral obligation to assent to, 
obey or respect that decision.3 It is therefore a question pertinent to those cases 
where a still-competent individual wishes to appoint a proxy for when they lose 
decision-making capacity, where we can ask what grounds we might have for 
respecting the decision of the proxy they have designated rather than the decisions 
of some other person or group of people. The simple response – that it is because 
the individual for whom they will be proxy did, in fact, designate them, either 
because they so wished it or because they have some sort of legal facility to do so –  
does not provide an answer to this ethical question about proxies. Moreover, 
answering this question will give an indication of the shape and scope of a proxy’s 
decision-making role in a way that appeal to the content of their decisions won’t. 
                                                 
3 This is broadly the account given in Anscombe (1981). 
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I will argue that we cannot account for the moral authority of a proxy through one of 
the most widespread approaches used to establish moral authority – appeal to a 
direct extension of our contemporaneously made autonomous decision-making – 
without generating some problematic challenges about their status. This, in turn, 
indicates that appeal to some other theoretical foundation for their authority might 
be a better route to follow. Also, by recognising the challenges that an autonomy-
based underpinning for the authority of proxy decision-makers creates, the role of 
the proxy themselves can be better understood and interpreted in terms of the 
limitations and scope of their decision-making. We will know, for example, whether 
we have a good ethical basis for challenging or accepting an unusual decision even if 
it is in accord with accepted approaches to the way in which the decision is arrived 
at, or whether a decision of a certain type is within the remit of an appointed proxy.  
 
With contemporaneously made autonomous decisions, views are remarkably settled 
as to the foundation of this position, whereby competent, autonomous (adult) 
individuals are generally considered to be free to make any decision they like about 
refusing or accepting possible options with regard to most aspects of their life.4 By 
contrast, there is little explicit discussion as to how it is we might transfer or 
‘bequeath’ such decision-making authority to another person so that they can make 
decisions on our behalf in a way that would be a direct extension of our own 
autonomous decision-making authority. This is not to say that justifications for 
respecting the decisions of a proxy are not available to us on moral grounds other 
                                                 
4 There are well-recognised limitations to this, such as on subjecting others to communicable diseases, 
on what is legally permissible, and on the right to receive any treatment that is demanded. 
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than as a bequeathed extension of our own autonomy, such as making appeal to the 
status of the proxy themselves as being in some way trustworthy or worthy of 
respect, or the way in which guardians or other decision-makers are appointed for 
children or people who have never been competent, often with a default to the ‘next 
of kin’.5 Moreover, there are plenty of cases where we grant limited decision-making 
authority to others to act as our agents whilst we are ourselves still competent, 
autonomous agents. However, the reason for addressing the transfer of authority in 
this way is that it is a direct challenge to an account widely used as an explanation of 
the ethical foundations for extended decision-making the “extension view”.6 This is 
the view that we can un-problematically extend our autonomous decision-making 
authority, if we make the correct provisions, once we have lost competence. There 
are, however, subtle but important differences between respecting an individual’s 
autonomy and transferring one’s autonomous decision-making authority to 
someone else altogether, such as irrevocability and the implications of such a 
transfer, that I will draw upon to argue that the extension view is a poor basis upon 
which to ground proxy decision-making.  
 
In order to highlight problems over the transfer of authority, I pose a two-horned 
dilemma for how we might conceive of decision-making authority using proxies. On 
the one horn of the dilemma, if proxies lack the moral authority of a 
contemporaneous autonomous decision then their use is curtailed because we 
would lack the moral obligation to respect a proxy’s decisions that we would have 
                                                 
5 See, for example, O’Neill & Ruddick (eds) (1979); Aiken & LaFollette (eds) (1980); Gaylin & 
Macklin (eds) (1982); Jonas (2007). 
6 The ‘extension view’ of precedent autonomy is a term used by Davis (2009) pp 349-374, and 
advocated by Buchanan & Brock (1990) and Dworkin (1994) pp 218-241. 
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were they the decisions of the still-autonomous individual.7 This would require us to 
establish the authority of a proxy on a different foundation and, as such, one which 
would not carry with it the same moral obligations that are associated with 
autonomous decision-making. If, however, proxy decisions do have the same moral 
authority of contemporaneous autonomous decisions then the other horn of the 
dilemma arises by creating the possibility for the repeated application of the 
extension of authority process. This would potentially allow the originally appointed 
proxy to appoint their own proxy to make decisions for both them and the person 
they were originally proxy for, resulting in decisions by decision-makers to whom the 
authority had not been initially extended. Although this second horn may be unlikely 
to manifest itself in practice, it still tells us something about the foundations of proxy 
decision-making and the extent to which it offers us control over future treatment 
decisions and whether this can really be said to be an extension of the original 
appointing individual’s autonomy. Awareness of such potential limitations might 
then have practical consequences in terms of whether we want our policy to be 
supported by theory and, subsequently, if policy is to reflect theory then whether 
this might impact on individuals as to whether they engage proxy decision-makers at 
all and upon what basis their decisions should be made.  
 
My argument is in three parts. In the first part, I begin by examining the nature of 
the moral authority that a proxy has to make decisions on behalf of another. I argue 
that if we accept an autonomous individual can in some way transfer or ‘bequeath’ 
                                                 
7 This is not to say that similar conceptual problems do not arise in the case of other methods of 
extended decision-making, such as advance directives. Rather, the use of proxies produces clearer 
illustrations of the dilemma and is therefore most suited to discussion.  
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moral authority to a proxy to make decisions on their behalf then we are faced with 
another question over how we characterise the ethical basis for respecting a proxy’s 
decisions. This, in turn, leads us to consider whether a proxy can be limited in the 
scope of things they are empowered to decide about whilst retaining a decision-
making authority that we have a duty to respect.  
 
In the second part, I present the dilemma itself in terms of a problem over the 
transitivity of authority; a relation understood in this context as: if A is a legitimate 
decision-maker for B, and if B is a legitimate decision-maker for C, then A is a 
legitimate decision-maker for C.8 The importance of the transitivity concern is that it 
is a relation we would expect to be present in bequeathing moral authority if such 
authority was equivalent to the decision-making powers that fully autonomous 
agents have over themselves.9 
 
In the third part, I consider and reject various responses to the problem posed by the 
dilemma. In doing so, we gain important insight into the nature of extended 
decision-making through proxies. If a growing number of people wish to make use of 
proxies as a means of retaining some overall control over their lives and protecting 
themselves from unwanted medical interventions then we should be clear as to 
                                                 
8 By ‘legitimate’ I mean ‘according to appropriate moral requirements’. I will leave legal legitimacy to 
one side as this paper concerns conceptual and ethical issues. Although there has been much discussion 
of who the legal decision-maker is, this is separable from the question of whether we have an ethical 
obligation to respect such decisions in the same way as we do in cases of contemporaneous 
autonomous decisions.  One notable exception is Dworkin (1988) pp 85-99, concerning representation 
and the proxy.   
9 I do not mean by this that there is a formal equivalence between the two such that the relation would 
be reflexive, symmetric and transitive. This is instead a claim about the requirement to respect the 
authority. If bequeathed authority has the equivalent requirement to be respected as that of the 
bequeathing autonomous individual, then we have the same requirements to follow the instructions of 
bequeathed authority as we do to follow the instructions of an autonomous agent.  
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what this involves. This is not, itself, intended as an argument against the use of 
proxy decision-making, although it may potentially be used to underpin an argument 
for paternalism towards non-autonomous people.10 Rather, the dilemma reveals we 
cannot proceed as if appointing a proxy was an unproblematic extension to our 
autonomous decision-making. If we still wish to embrace proxy decision-making, it 
should not be seen, ultimately, as simply transferring or ‘bequeathing’ one’s own 
contemporaneously made autonomous decision-making authority. Instead, viewing 
proxies as ‘advisors in decision-making’ and giving an alternative – and more limited 
– basis for their authority to make decisions on behalf of the incapacitated individual 
would form the best basis of our ethical underpinnings for proxy decision-making.  
 
2. Autonomy and Moral Authority for Proxy Decision-Making 
Although there has been growing concern over the amount of emphasis placed on 
autonomy in fields such as bioethics in recent years,11 there is little doubt that 
autonomy and the corresponding ethical duty of respect for autonomy play a 
fundamental role in forming the underpinnings of extended decision-making. This 
view is often seen as placing very strong requirements to respect an autonomous 
individual’s “virtually unlimited right” to refuse treatment should they wish to make 
a decision about future treatment choices.12 Extended decision-making is therefore 
often conceived, at its most basic, as intended to provide an extension of our 
                                                 
10 I shall not consider this line in depth, as it is a substantive issue in its own right. I raise it in 
recognition that this might be a more radical response to the problem of being unable to justify an 
extension of our autonomy.  
11 See, for example, O’Neill (2002); Wilson, (2007); Dawson (2010). 
12 As expressed in Buchanan  (1988). This is the dominant view in the literature on the topic and is true 
not only of proxy decision-making but also other major approaches to extended decision-making, such 
as advance statements. See also Wrigley (2007a) for a discussion of the implications of this for advance 
directives.  
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contemporaneous autonomous decision-making. In the case of proxies, this is 
broadly conceived as an extension of the decision-making process whereby a still 
autonomous person designates another individual as a surrogate decision-maker to 
assume decision-making power with regard to their care or treatment, should they 
become incompetent to decide. 13  
 
Although such an account of proxy decision-making appears to be a natural 
extension of autonomous wishes, whereby we are able to choose who should make 
decisions for us; it leaves a number of conceptual and ethical questions implicit or 
unanswered. First and foremost amongst these is how we are to characterise 
autonomy when it is used to underpin extended decision-making using proxies. 
Given the numerous accounts of autonomy available and that no one account has 
been settled on as forming the basis for extended decision-making, I shall focus upon 
those aspects of autonomy that I consider most suited to grounding proxy decision-
making.  
 
The relevant aspects of autonomy, often characterised in terms of ‘personal’ or 
‘individual’ autonomy, are those that concern the nature of certain kinds of choice 
and the corresponding rationale to respect such choices. This includes the view that 
takes autonomous individuals to be free in the sense of self-determination; that is to 
                                                 
13 See, for example, the characterisation of proxies given in Buchanan & Brock (1990) or Wrigley 
(2007b). It should be noted that these arguments concern only proxies appointed by the individual on 
whose behalf they make decisions and not proxies who are appointed by others, in such roles as 
advocates or wards of court, or who take up a ‘presumptive authority’ as a proxy, such as a family 
member.  
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make certain sorts of choices for themselves.14 These elements – self-determination 
through self-governance or sovereignty over ourselves – are central to a range of 
well-developed accounts.15 Once autonomy is conceived in terms of having 
sovereignty over ourselves, the moral basis of respect for autonomy directly follows 
as a corollary: we respect autonomous decisions by individuals because of their right 
to control what happens within that sphere of sovereignty.  Characterising autonomy 
in terms of control or self-government over one’s self is also important to account 
for the possibility of extending decision-making as a way that is designed to 
perpetuate such self-determination.   
 
Although this conception of autonomy provides a clear justification for an individual 
to retain control over their contemporaneous autonomous decisions, what happens 
when we try and extend decision-making beyond that through a proxy is distinctly 
murky by comparison. The implicit thought is that if autonomous agents have 
sovereignty over themselves and are free to control what happens within that 
sphere of sovereignty (in terms of refusing or accepting treatments), then their wish 
to appoint a proxy to make treatment decisions on their behalf is another aspect of 
respecting that control they have over themselves. However, much of the 
explanatory work seems to depend on a presumption that the proxy can somehow 
                                                 
14 This is in contrast to conceptions that are concerned with the possession of certain capacities to make 
certain kinds of choice, for example, an account of autonomy that associates it directly with a capacity 
might indicate that once a person has lost that capacity, it would be impossible to extend decision-
making past that point. A range of concerns about the implications of loss of capacity in relation to 
extended decision-making are discussed in the literature. See, for example, Wrigley (2007a). Kantian 
views of autonomy might also not admit of transfer, as argued by Kuflick (1984). 
15 Although there are numerous differences and nuances between them, such an account of autonomy is 
found in, for example, Dworkin (1988) pp 15-16;  Feinberg (1986) p 54; Beauchamp & Childress 
(2001) p 58. 
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readily have this decision-making authority transferred to them at the request of a 
still autonomous individual just in virtue of them being selected as a proxy.  
 
In order to attempt to capture what processes are at work in transferring decision-
making authority to a proxy, it is important to distinguish three closely related 
elements that underpin the moral authority of a proxy to make decisions. These are: 
(i) The scope of the proxy directive 
(ii) The authority of the proxy in relation to what falls under (i) 
(iii) The ethical basis for respecting a proxy’s decisions given (i) and (ii). 
 
Although strongly linked, each plays a separable role in establishing the foundations 
of proxy decision-making. In (i), the scope of the proxy directive concerns what areas 
the proxy can make decisions about concerning the person they are proxy for. The 
scope might be limitless, with a proxy instructed to make decisions over all aspects 
of a person’s life, or the scope might be limited to specific areas, such as financial 
decisions or to medical treatment. The scope may even be limited to specific 
decisions, such as making medical treatment decisions for certain conditions but not 
for others.  
 
In (ii), the second element concerns what authority judgements made in (i) have 
when they are made by a proxy. One may consider transferring or ‘bequeathing’ 
authority to a proxy in one of two basic ways or some third way that lies 
intermediate between the two. The first is that the proxy is appointed to act as an 
advocate rather than a direct extension of one’s decision-making authority, so that 
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the proxy is an additional spokesperson for representing one’s views where decisions 
are being considered by those with the duty of care for the incapacitated individual. 
This confines the proxy to an advisory role of being ‘one voice amongst many’ when 
treatment decisions are considered by all those involved, such as medical teams, 
family members, etc. but still gives the proxy an important function in virtue of being 
independent from those other decision-makers and having been selected specifically 
to fulfil a decision-making role. This basis would automatically have implications for 
(iii), the third element that underpins moral authority, because it would mean that, 
aside from considering the views put forward by a proxy, we do not have the same 
ethical obligation to respect the proxy’s decisions that we have to respect 
contemporaneous autonomous decisions.16 This still leaves open some alternative 
account for explaining the authority of the proxy that is not based on a direct 
extension of one’s autonomy, however,  such an account would not be able to utilise 
the same very strong obligations of authority that derive from such autonomy-based 
extension arguments.   
 
At the other end of the spectrum is the approach whereby one grants absolute 
decision-making power, where a proxy is appointed with the intention of their 
making decisions with an authority that should be followed as if it were a 
contemporaneous autonomous decision of the person who appointed them. This still 
leaves a third option of the proxy being more than an advisor but with limitations on 
their authority. For example, a proxy may be appointed with the authority to refuse 
                                                 
16 This does not mean that the views put forward by the proxy should not be considered or that they are 
not in some way important in virtue of the appointed role a proxy has, just that we are not morally 
obliged to respect them as we would be for a contemporaneous decision made by an autonomous agent. 
See Keywood (2003) for an explanation of the advocate-type role of a proxy.  
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any treatment other than a life-saving one, or that they may be able to overrule the 
decisions of one doctor but not the decision of an entire specialist treatment team. 
This does not mean that there are no alternative foundations for proxy decision-
making outside the ethical conception I am discussing. For example, one could hold a 
view that it is purely a legal construction and we therefore have a legal obligation to 
respect a proxy’s decisions. This would not, however, mean that proxies were an 
extension of autonomous decision-making or explain why their decisions are the sort 
of thing we should respect such that they are enshrined in law. This is why the 
foundational ethical question as to what underpins the decision-making authority of 
proxies is of genuine importance: without it we are unable to determine why it is we 
should justify one particular system over another, even though we may be in 
agreement that the aim of facilitating health care decision-making is a broad social 
good.17 I will return to discuss the implications for intermediary positions in section 
3. 
 
I have so far characterised the authority in (ii) only in terms of the authority that the 
person appointing the proxy wishes them to have. For authority to be effective, what 
is also needed is an explanation of how this connects with (iii) to form the ethical 
basis for respecting a proxy’s judgement. This requires a conception of authority in a 
normative sense of ‘that which we have a moral duty to respect’ or ‘the right to be 
obeyed’.18 This also distinguishes it from the practical sense of the term, such as 
                                                 
17 See also Davis (2004) for a discussion of establishing precedent autonomy as a means of settling 
conflicts between known conflicting preferences of an incompetent person. 
18 This is the basic characterisation given by Anscombe (1981) p 43. There are, of course, other 
conceptions of authority that we are all familiar with and which might have some bearing on how we 
respond to a proxy’s judgement, such as legal authority or more broadly political authority. However, 
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‘authority in the field’, questions about the appropriateness of the standing of the 
proxy (such as are they a fit and proper person), or their legal standing.  
 
However, although we may have a moral duty to obey the contemporaneous 
treatment decisions of a still autonomous agent that does not mean we 
automatically have a similar duty towards the decisions of their proxy. Simply 
defining ‘authority’ in terms of ‘that which we have a moral duty to obey’ does little 
explanatory work as to how or why it is that this ‘duty to obey’ might be transferred 
to another person by bequeathing it to a proxy. How a proxy might be bequeathed 
such a degree of authority based on an account of how autonomy can be extended 
in such a way as to grant an equivalent decision-making authority to another person 
has never been made explicit by any view that endorses an extension account of 
autonomy as a basis for forms of extended decision-making. 
 
Current accounts of precedent autonomy do not indicate that we can simply pass on 
authority to just anyone we choose. It is not as simple as making the case for 
respecting future-oriented, non-contemporaneous wishes that might be provided in 
the form of an Advance Directive, whereby we have reason to respect those wishes 
because the (now) incapacitated person actually decided that was what he or she 
wanted. Even where it would be my autonomous decision that someone make 
decisions on my behalf, I am in effect saying that it is their decisions (that of the 
proxy) that should now be respected as if they were my own, whilst recognising that 
they are not my own decisions per se. The demands of autonomy only cover those 
                                                                                                                                            
my focus here only concerns whether there is any sort of ethical duty stemming from a respect for 
autonomy by which we should respect proxy decision-making. 
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decisions that I directly make myself. Even in cases where I allow another to make 
decisions on my behalf, such as by appointing an accountant to make decisions 
about my financial transactions, these are all decisions that I might approve or reject 
as I see fit. The crucial asymmetry in appointing a proxy is that the transfer of 
decision-making authority is absolute in a way that contemporaneous autonomous 
decision-making does not allow; that is, it is authority over me rather than by me.19 
Even alternative accounts of precedent autonomy that are based on notions of 
integrity and ‘whole-life’ wishes rather than those concerned primarily with self-
governance or sovereignty over one’s self (Dworkin 1994), do not explicitly explain 
how I could transfer decision-making authority to another person in this way 
precisely because they are based on the view that the value of autonomy is to 
protect character and a certain capacity such that it “allows each of us to lead our 
own lives rather than be led along them” (Dworkin 1994, p 224). Although it may be 
a genuine wish that someone else makes decisions on our behalf, it would seem that 
the appointment of a proxy does not neatly cohere with living our own life but rather 
with having someone else make decisions about our life.  
 
However, it does still seem to be possible to grant other people authority over 
ourselves in certain contexts, the most obvious being in politics. Just such an 
approach is taken by Gerald Dworkin (1988) in one of the few attempts to directly 
establish the underpinnings of proxy consent.20  It is therefore important to consider 
                                                 
19 One might wish to draw parallels to Kant’s account of the wrongness of slavery in this regard – that 
decisions as to what I may or may not do are made by others rather than myself and this undermines 
my very status as an autonomous agent. See, for example, Haltman (2007) p 113. 
20 Dworkin’s arguments simply equate modes of political representation with proxy decision-making. 
For example, the view that there exists an ‘identity of interests’ corresponding between a patient and 
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how such an account from political philosophy could provide a substantial 
theoretical basis in the case of transfer of authority to proxies. Although a detailed 
exploration of the concept of authority is beyond the scope of this paper, some 
explanation as to how authority can be transferred to others is essential for our 
understanding of the moral authority of proxies.  
 
The concept of “authority” is itself challenging to define but it can be characterised 
in terms of: 
“performing the task of deciding what actions are required by the reasons for 
action that its subjects accept and gives to the subjects directives which they 
treat as replacing these reasons as a basis for action.”21 
Such a characterisation can explain the process taking place in extended decision-
making using proxies. That we accept the transfer of authority in decision-making to 
a proxy is because we can provide a set of reasons to obey the instructions of a proxy 
on the grounds that they are reasons we already would accept as a basis for 
following such decisions.   
 
So what could these reasons be? Three broad claims are usually offered as reasons 
for extending decision-making authority:22  
(a) It increases scope of personal autonomy by allowing individuals a degree of 
self-determination in relation to their care when no longer competent.  
                                                                                                                                            
their proxy is taken to be a justification simpliciter for their authority (p 91). However, this does not, by 
itself, give a reason why the proxy and not some other person with similar interests has authority.   
21 McMahon, (1987) pp 306-7. This is based on Raz, (1985). 
22 See Buchanan and Brock (1990) pp 98-9. 
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(b) It gives rise to improved welfare, for example, by allowing a shortening of a 
perceived valueless or suffering life, the continuance of a valued life, or the 
protection from unwanted bodily violations.  
(c) It allows individuals to practice a form of altruism, by allowing them to relieve 
emotional or financial concerns or to attempt to relieve social burdens on 
resource use.  
 
Each of these reasons is, of itself, an aspect of exercising an autonomous choice. 
Should a person choose to practice greater self-determination, or to guard their 
perceived future welfare, or to practice a perceived future good, they are all choices 
that arise from an initial decisions made by an autonomous agent. This, in turn, 
provides a reason we would normally accept as sufficient for following that decision 
because we already acknowledge a duty to respect the autonomous wishes of that 
agent. This means that the reasons we have to accept the authority of a proxy are all 
grounded in our respect for the appointing person’s autonomous decisions. That is, 
we accept the authority of a proxy because their decisions are exactly replacing what 
we would already accept as reason to respect such decisions – the autonomous 
choice of the person who appointed them. Even if someone who is charged with the 
treatment of a patient should consider a decision provided by a proxy to be unwise 
or against their judgement, they still have an adequate reason to accept the 
authority of that decision given that the decision is just a replacement of the 
autonomous wish of the patient in question. The upshot of this is that if we are to 
grant that a proxy has the moral authority to make decisions then it is because these 
decisions are the equivalent of a contemporaneously-made autonomous decision by 
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the now incapacitated person. In other words, proxy decisions have moral authority 
because they are the equivalent of a contemporaneous autonomous decision. 
However, as I will discuss in the next section, it is questionable whether the 
considerations that justify autonomy also justify the transferring of authority to a 
proxy.  
 
It is worth noting that the two commonly recognised guidance principles of proxy 
decision-making are also attempts to capture something of the reasons why we 
should follow the instructions of a proxy. Such principles determine the way in which 
a proxy is required to formulate their decisions concerning the incapacitated person. 
The two major approaches are: 
 
(SJ) Substituted Judgement: where the proxy uses their special knowledge of the 
incapacitated person’s preferences to make the decision that the person would have 
made, were she competent.  
 
(BI) Best Interests: where the proxy makes an assessment of the person’s best 
interests and makes a decision based on that assessment.  
 
The guidance principles have come under some considerable critical discussion for a 
variety of reasons and opinion is divided as to which principle should be followed. 
Some, such as Dan Brock (1993), have favoured a substituted judgement role. 
Others, such as John Harris (2003), have argued for a best interests formulation.  
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In both cases, there is an attempt to provide a reason why we should respect the 
judgement of a proxy based on the content or type of judgement it is rather than 
who made that decision. With the substituted judgement role (SJ), the reason is that 
attempting to replicate the actual decision-making process of the incapacitated 
person is the closest we can get to determining what their contemporaneous 
autonomous wishes would have been, were they still competent.23 This allows a 
continuation of self-determining decisions to be made on the grounds that they are 
just the sort of self-determining decisions that the incapacitated person would have 
made. In the case of Best Interests (BI), the reason is that the proxy’s decisions are 
protecting the perceived welfare of the incapacitated person by a means previously 
decided by the person appointing them. Hence a proxy can be appointed on the 
understanding that they have a particular principle guiding their role and that this 
principle is replicating one of the reasons we understand as important for respecting 
a person’s autonomous decision at the time the proxy was appointed.  
 
3. Challenges to Extending Decision-Making  
The moral authority of decisions made by proxies seems, therefore, to derive from a 
prior respect for a person’s autonomous choice to extend their decision-making 
through the act of appointing them, supported in turn by an account of the nature of 
authority. This is true not only of proxies appointed under the substituted judgement 
standard but also those appointed under the best-interests standard, as it is a claim 
about how they derived their decision-making authority in the first place rather than 
the basis upon which they may their decisions. If a proxy has the moral authority to 
                                                 
23 Whether such counterfactual claims are themselves coherent is extremely dubious. See Barnbaum, 
(1999) and Wrigley (2011) for further discussion. 
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make decisions, it is because their decisions have the same authority as a 
contemporaneously-made autonomous decision. However, there is more to be said 
about the implications that stem from accepting such authority. In particular, we 
cannot uncritically assume that extending decision-making by bequeathing the 
authority to a proxy is unproblematic. After all, just because I wish to bequeath 
authority to someone does not automatically mean that others will regard them as 
having authority. The concern here is that we might still doubt whether extended 
decision-making generates the equivalent moral authority to a decision made 
contemporaneously by a fully autonomous agent. One important way this concern 
arises is through the following question: 
 
(MA) If moral authority associated with decision-making is extendable by 
transferring decision-making powers to a proxy then is such authority 
continuously transferable? 
 
The concern raised by (MA) is that if you agree to the principle of being able to 
extend decision-making in a way that transfers your own moral authority as an 
autonomous agent, then you would have to face the question of the transitivity of 
that transfer.  
 
To illustrate this concern, suppose person A appoints a proxy, person B, in the belief 
that this grants the proxy all of the decision-making powers over personal welfare 
and treatment decisions for A. Also suppose that person B becomes in some way 
incapacitated or unable to make decisions affecting their own or anyone else’s 
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treatment. However, also suppose that person B knew that this would happen, for 
example through being diagnosed with some condition that leads to gradual 
deterioration of their cognitive state (or perhaps person B was immensely prudent 
and made provision in the case of a sudden eventuality). As such, person B appoints 
a proxy of their own – person C.  
 
Suppose not only this, but also that person B was aware they still had the 
responsibility of decision-making for person A, and so B determines that person C is 
to make decisions on their behalf for person A as well. Such a transfer could be 
continuously iterated as many times as you like. Provided this is done in line with the 
theoretical basis upon which the proxy was appointed, the decision is not going 
against their role. Hence proxy B might think it was in A’s best interests to be 
represented by C when B is no longer capable of deciding for A; or that C could make 
substituted judgements for B, which would include B’s judgements about A.  
 
The concern is that if extended decision-making conveys with it the same moral 
authority to make decisions as the original autonomous agent would have, then part 
of decision-making authority is the ability to choose to extend your moral authority 
by appointing a proxy, given that appointment of a proxy is itself a decision about 
the personal welfare and treatment decisions of an individual. But this would mean 
that we must accept the transitive nature of transferring decision-making authority, 
so that the proxy of our own proxy could become our proxy, or that our own proxy 
could write an advance directive indicating treatment for us. The concern is 
therefore whether moral authority to make decisions is transitive in this way: 
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(T) If C is proxy to B and B is proxy to A then can C be proxy to A? 
 
This problem can be captured in argument form to make the inferential problem 
clear:  
 
(TA) The Transitivity Argument 
 
1. We respect the autonomous decisions of an individual, A, and we respect 
their authority to extend those decision (via a proxy). 
2. Extended decision-making should be respected as if it were the decision of 
the autonomous individual who extended it in this way.  
3. So (from 1. and 2.) we respect the authority of decisions made by proxies as if 
they were the autonomous decision of the individual they concern. 
4. If a proxy decides to extend their own decision-making, those decisions 
should be respected (from 1. and 2.) 
5. A proxy’s decision-making authority includes decisions about individual A 
(from 1., 2. and 3.) 
6. Therefore a proxy’s authority to extend their decision-making about 
individual A should be respected (from 4. and 5.) 
7. Therefore a proxy can extend their decision-making through another proxy 
and that will include authoritative decisions about individual A that should be 
respected (from 4., 5. and 6.) 
8. Therefore we should accept extended decision-making is transitive, ad 
infinitum (corollary of 7.) 
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Doubtless the first response to this conclusion is simply, “why is this important?” 
Why isn’t the answer just, “no, you cannot transfer this authority repeatedly”? The 
problem with such a response, however, is that rejecting this transitivity would also 
be to deny that extended decision-making carries with it the sort of authority it is 
expected to possess if we are to be obliged to respect it in the first place.24 This point 
is crucial and requires some further clarification. 
 
If extended decision-making is to extend the authority to make decisions as the 
original autonomous agent would have had, then part of this decision-making 
authority is the ability to choose to extend your authority by appointing a proxy. The 
point being that we would be obliged to accept the decisions issued by a proxy as if 
they were the autonomous individual making them (otherwise we would not have 
sufficient reason to accept the transfer of authority in the first place). Therefore, by 
appointing a proxy, the practice of transferring decision-making authority is itself 
endorsed. Any proxy appointed would subsequently be equally placed to do likewise. 
As the person appointed as proxy has authority over their own decision-making and 
part of that decision-making comprises authority over the person they are proxy for, 
then a transfer of the proxy’s decision-making authority would have two (or 
potentially more) people within its scope.  
 
                                                 
24 It might be the case that, once this conceptual dilemma is revealed to people, they attempt to appoint 
a proxy with a caveat specifying that their authority should not be treated as if it is transitive. For a 
discussion of this point, see (L1) in Section 4, below.  
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At this point, an advocate of extended decision-making may wish simply to bite the 
bullet and accept the possibility of multiple iterated proxies. As long as those 
engaging in the process were clear that this is a possibility, then there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with it. However, accepting this does seem to pose a more severe 
practical problem for substituted judgement approaches to proxy decision making 
than for best-interests approaches, as transitivity may result in someone very far 
removed from the initial person to whom the decision-making authority was 
bequeathed making decisions that directly affect the treatment of an individual.25 
That one could claim that a proxy appointed by a proxy was a genuine extension of 
the, now-incapacitated, initially appointing individual’s autonomy is to stretch the 
concept of autonomy to its limits as the originally appointing individual is now quite 
far removed from the process.  
 
Such concerns, in turn, may lead to a change in practice and attitude towards 
extended decision-making in order to avoid the loss of knowledge about an 
individual’s wishes and preferences that are central for the success of a substituted 
judgement approach. On the one hand, individuals appointing a proxy may wish to 
take the judgement of their proxy in appointing another proxy as part of their good 
faith in the judgements of their initial proxy, so that the substituted judgement of 
their proxy would take the following form: “As proxy to person A, I, person B, make 
the substituted judgement that if B became incapacitated then A would want B to 
appoint a proxy C who could make substituted judgements as if they were B.”  
                                                 
25 It is important to remember that the standard for appointing a proxy on the substituted judgement 
(SJ) basis is not that they are the person best placed to make substituted judgements but only that they 
are the person of whom it is desired that they should make decisions based upon that principle.  
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Alternatively, they may wish to agree that judgements may ultimately have to be 
made on best interests grounds and their initially appointed proxy is still best placed 
to determine who should be appointed to make those judgements, such that: “If B 
became incapacitated then they could make a substituted judgement for A to 
appoint a proxy C who could make decisions for A in their best interests.” This could 
ultimately be seen as an endorsement of the whole proxy appointment process 
where proxy decision-making is retained as a dynamic means of meeting new 
challenges that may arise and also as a means of at least attaining some link 
between an initially appointed decision-maker and any subsequent ones, albeit we 
must also recognise that by appointing a proxy we set it into motion but we may 
potentially end up with a proxy far removed from our initial choice.  
 
If, on the other hand, the transitivity conclusion is something that you wish to reject, 
two possible alternatives arise: 
(R 1) Show that transfer of decision-making authority is not transitive but 
nevertheless conveys the same authority as the original autonomous agent, 
with a limit on the ability to extend decision-making powers further.  
 
This looks like an ideal result for proponents of proxy decision-making to adopt. 
However, what is less than clear is how one might limit powers in a non-arbitrary 
way. If we are to allow the basic principle that autonomous agents can extend their 
decision-making authority and we wish to consider such extended decision-making 
has the same authority as the autonomous agent, any arbitrary block on the 
authority would indicate it is not the same kind of authority an autonomous agent 
 25 
has. If it is a different kind of authority then it is no longer obvious that we have any 
strong obligation to respect decisions made through the extended decision-making 
process, as their whole underpinning was based on respect for autonomy.  
 
The other option is: 
(R 2) Agree that the transitivity of a full decision-making authority is 
unacceptable and thereby acknowledge that extended decision-making is of a 
different and more limited kind than you would have over yourself as an 
autonomous agent.  
 
You could thereby reject the transitivity on the grounds that although you can 
bequeath your decision-making authority through a proxy, the limited authority this 
gives the proxy means as soon as a proxy tries to bequeath these decision-making 
powers, they find they can no longer do so as we have no grounds for accepting their 
wishes to do so. This, however, has similar problems to (R1): you would have to 
accept that because these extended decision-making methods do not have the same 
kind of authority that we find in an autonomous individual we might not be obliged 
to honour any of their decisions in the same way, as diminished authority does not 
convey the same requirement to respect it as the wishes of an autonomous agent. 
So the corollary of this position is that it is not just the authority to transfer decision-
making power that goes; it is also the authority over treatment decisions themselves. 
The upshot of this is that such decisions could reasonably be overturned for 
paternalistic reasons because they do not have the moral authority of autonomously 
made decisions over oneself. Such a view of authority that the proxy may have under 
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this view corresponds with what Uniacke (2013, p 98) calls “consideration respect”, 
whereby we take account of someone’s wishes but then come to a decision upon a 
balance of consideration. Nevertheless, in both (R1) and (R2) there are still potential 
defences that could be offered to justify why we should still accept the authority of 
their proxy which must be considered in more detail before the extension view 
account of authority would need to be replaced by some alternative moral 
underpinning for proxies.  
 
4. The ‘Setting of Limits’ Defence 
The responses (R1) and (R2) require a proponent of extended decision-making to try 
and block the problem through specifying strict limits on transferring authority. This 
way they can both retain the authority of the extended decision-making process 
whilst heading off the potential problem that multiple transfers of authority might 
raise.  
 
There are two routes by which this setting of limits might be implemented: 
(L 1) Attempt to specify one and only one individual to be the decision-
maker.  
Such that a still competent person creates a clear directive appointing a proxy with 
the caveat that, “I authorize you – and only you – to make decisions relating to my 





 (L2) Attempt to make a universal prohibition that will apply to all. 
Such that a still-competent person creates a clear directive along the lines of “No 
one is to administer treatment x on me” (where ‘x’ is, for example, CPR). The thought 
behind this is that the directive will stay in place for the lifetime of the patient and 
takes precedence over any other decision.  
 
In the case of (L 1), it is open to the concern that limiting the scope of authority of 
the appointed proxy by bequeathing to them the decision to make some decisions 
(those they directly make for the person who appointed them) but not others 
(decisions about who determines decisions), is to bequeath them authority of a 
nature and degree less than that of an autonomous agent. As such, it is not clear that 
we are morally obliged to respect any decision they make in the way we are obliged 
to respect the decisions of an autonomous agent, although we may wish to establish 
the authority of a proxy to make decisions on some other basis, such as their innate 
trustworthiness or the respect they were held in by the incapacitated person.  
However, without the strong obligations derived from an account decision-making 
authority based on an extension of autonomy, the decisions would be those of an 
advisor with a special relationship to the incapacitated person, rather than as if they 
were the autonomous person making self-governing decisions. This might be a 
concern for anyone wishing their proxy to be able to make or reproduce decisions 
that seem odd, irrational or unusual to another third party or if they had views that 
could be considered not typically in their best interest. Although an autonomous 
agent is at liberty to make such decisions about their life or their treatment, an 
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advisor’s decisions along the same lines will always be subject to additional third 
party scrutiny and potential refusal. 
 
However, this concern might itself be countered on the grounds that proxies can be 
appointed with very specific remits in other areas of life, such as arranging a person’s 
financial affairs, without loss of their authority to make decisions within that narrow 
remit. As a proxy appointed with such a remit would not be able to make decisions 
over other areas of the incapacitated person’s life, why should the case of a proxy 
appointed to make welfare and treatment decisions be any different?  
 
This raises the question as to whether we can bequeath authority over a very narrow 
scope to limit the area of decision-making over which a proxy makes decisions. It 
seems entirely feasible to designate that a proxy is only appointed in order to make 
decisions in some narrow band of one’s future treatments, for example in relation to 
the use of a ventilator, but they are not appointed in order to make decisions over 
other treatment areas, such as blood transfusions. In appointing a proxy in this way, 
an autonomous agent is attempting to bequeath to the proxy the decision-making 
authority as if they were that autonomous agent themselves but only within that 
narrow scope.  
 
The additional question as to whether a proxy could appoint another proxy to make 
decisions on their behalf in the same way within the narrow area of scope depends 
upon how we understand scope as well as authority. ‘Scope’ could be interpreted as:  
 (S1) Incorporating all decisions that relate to a designated area  
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 or  
(S2) Involving a distinction between 1st and 2nd-order decisions for a 
designated area.  
 
On the simple understanding of scope in (S1), a proxy, B, could appoint their own 
proxy, C, to cover decisions concerning person A,  as an extension of the decision-
making authority B has so long as proxy C’s decisions fall within the scope that 
person A designated. The rationale behind this is that determining who should make 
the treatment decisions for someone is itself a decision concerning the welfare or 
treatment of an individual, which would mean this was within the remit of a proxy 
tasked with making even a narrow-scope treatment decision. As such, it could 
plausibly be made on the basis of a substituted judgement (person A would have 
wanted their proxy, person B, to appoint person C as proxy to make substituted 
judgements for them, should B become incapacitated) or a best interests judgement 
(proxy B determines that it is in the best interests of person A that person C take 
over as their proxy should B be incapacitated). This can be replicated for other kinds 
of scope. For example, if person A appointed their proxy, B, with an unlimited scope, 
then B would bequeath the authority to another proxy, C, to make all decisions 
affecting A. Whereas if person A appointed a proxy with a limited scope, such as 
refusal of certain treatments, then proxy B could only bequeath authority to proxy C 
within that same narrow scope of treatment options for A.  
 
The other view of scope (S2) is that it involves higher-order decisions. The proxy for 
person A could remain completely authoritative for 1st-order decisions within the 
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designated scope. A 1st-order decision would be one that, for example, relates 
directly to decisions concerning the acceptance or refusal of medical treatment. 
However, the proxy might not have 2nd-order decision-making powers within their 
scope. 2nd-order decisions are those that concern decisions about who gets to make 
decisions. This would mean that transferring or bequeathing decision-making 
authority to another proxy would not fall within the scope of the original proxy. 
 
What is important to the conceptual understanding of proxy decision-making is the 
issue of the scope of the decision-making does not directly help with the concerns 
over the legitimacy of the transfer of authority itself. That is, if we wish to make 
distinctions between 1st and 2nd-order scope for proxy authority, we can still ask is 
what is bequeathed in terms of 1st-order decision-making the sort of authority an 
autonomous agent has? Limiting the higher-order decision-making of a proxy would 
force the claim that they lack the authority of contemporaneous autonomous 
decision-making. If this is the case, we are back to the concern that we must offer an 
alternative moral underpinning as to why we have any reason to respect proxy 
decisions which may involve a weaker obligation to respect those decisions.  
 
This does not mean that we could not appoint a proxy with a narrow remit that was 
restricted to 1st-order decision-making (or even many different proxies, each with 
their own narrow remit). Making such an appointment upon clear grounds would 
still give those charged with delivering our treatment and welfare provision a reason 
to treat the decision of the proxy as a good indication of wishes and preferences of 
the incapacitated person. But understanding that a proxy decision provides a good 
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indication of treatment wishes is very different from having a moral obligation to 
respect such a decision. It would precisely be the moral obligation to respect a 
proxy’s decisions that would be lost by narrowing the scope of their remit in this 
way. Proxies could no longer make decisions with the same authority that the 
incapacitated individual could have were they still competent. Hence, if the 
expectation is that proxy decision-making is a direct extension of autonomous 
decision-making then narrowing the scope of decision-making authority will directly 
undermine this presumption.  
 
The alternative approach to preventing transitivity problems was the second 
limitation defence (L 2) whereby an additional universal prohibition is issued, such as 
“no one is to attempt to resuscitate me”. Such clear and universal directives do not 
seem to suffer from the transitivity problem I have outlined. There remains a 
separate problem as to the coherency of such sweeping statements amongst the 
many separable problems raised in the literature concerning the generalisability of 
advance statements (for example, in this case would attempting to clear the 
blockage from someone choking on a piece of food mean that they were attempting 
resuscitation).26 However, as there is no attempt to bequeath authority to another 
decision-maker through this process, transitivity is not itself an issue. Indeed, making 
such advance directives may be the clearest route for those wishing to retain the 
authority of extended decision-making without the danger of the transitivity 
concern.27 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Buchanan (1988). 
27 This is not to say that such advance directives are unproblematic, only that they are not directly 




Proxies can provide a very useful service in terms of guiding treatment for an 
incapacitated individual and be a great help to health care providers in determining 
the best course of treatment. Therefore their existence and their function are likely 
to be a desirable aspect for providing insight into an incapacitated individual’s life 
and desires. The mere fact that anyone is identified to help make these decisions 
might therefore be widely considered as a boon. However, the need for clarifying the 
ethical underpinnings of a proxy’s status is most needed in those challenging areas 
or cases where their authority to make certain decisions comes into question. It is 
therefore important for anyone wishing to engage in the practice of appointing a 
proxy to have a clear view of the nature, scope and limits of the decision-making 
authority of their proxy. The aim of this paper has been to bring into question one 
significant way in which we might establish this ethical underpinning.  Each option in 
light of the transitivity concern has implications for how we should understand and 
interpret the process of decision-making using proxies if we base an account of their 
authority on the extension view of autonomy.  
 
The strong obligation to respect the decision of a proxy under such a view, whereby 
moral authority is transferred or bequeathed to the proxy by an autonomous 
individual, is both challenging to capture and has potentially problematic 
implications. If we accept that it is possible to convey moral authority as an 
extension of one’s contemporaneously made autonomous decision-making then we 
have to accept that it could be extended to someone who we do not know, or agree 
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with, and that they could end up making major decisions about our treatment 
options. This may not be seen as problematic if an individual would be otherwise left 
without a proxy and one must be identified by health care providers from some 
predetermined list of relatives or through the state, on the grounds that at least 
there is some connection between the now incapacitated individual and the choice 
of proxy. However, it would be difficult to consider the proxy appointed by a proxy 
as a genuine extension of the original individuals own autonomous decision-making. 
Alternatively, we could accept that our extended decision-making does not have the 
same authority as would our contemporaneous autonomous decision-making, and as 
such, is open to paternalistic rejection by others. Again, this route may not be seen 
as a problem if individuals are content with appointing a proxy on some other 
grounds, such as the trustworthy nature of a potential proxy. Either way, it is 
important that proxy decision-making is viewed in the appropriate light and not seen 
as a simple and unproblematic means of guaranteeing that our current views and 
opinions will be adhered to when we are no longer able to express them.28   
                                                 
28 I would like to thank Angus Dawson for his very helpful comments on a draft version of this paper, 
Monique Jonas for her advice on the role of decision-makers in the case of children, Nicky Priaulx for 
useful discussion on legal-ethical aspects of proxy decision-making, audiences at the WCB and Welsh 
Medico-Legal Society where early versions of the paper were presented, and three anonymous referees 
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